
Marketing techniques and the 'Egg of Thaksin'
February 9, 2001
SHORTLY after the election, Chuan Leekpai, the outgoing prime minister,
poured scorn on Thaksin Shinawatra upon hearing that the leader of the Thai Rak
Thai Party would run Thailand as a business enterprise. Thaksin had said that as
prime minister, he would preside over the government as a CEO would run his
company. Quipped Chuan: "Thailand is not a company. One cannot fire people
the way a company does."
Having spent most of his career in the political arena, the
bureaucratically-minded Chuan, of course, had no clue whatsoever about the real
challenge he would be facing from his political opponent. In Thaksin he saw only
money politics. In other words, the telecom billionaire was going to buy his way
into power.
In politics, money is a big part, but it's not altogether the whole story.
It's true Thai Rak Thai massively outspent its rivals. Yet the method by which
Thaksin plotted his strategy, structured his political campaign and executed it,
played an equally big part. It was a whole new ballgame, at least as far as
Thailand was concerned. You may call it "social marketing" or
"political marketing", and it resulted in phenomenal success for Thai
Rak Thai at the polls. The party won 248 seats out of the 500 up for grabs,
becoming the first in Thai history to almost grab an outright mandate.
In a way, Thaksin's rise to power mirrors that of former Italian prime
minister Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi was a successful entrepreneur. He aimed
to rid Italy of communism and bring its political system closer to the US model.
He applied his business enterprise methods to the running of the government.
Over a period of two years in the run-up to the January 6 election, Thaksin
worked on the politics of numbers. Thanks to his deep pockets, he brought
incumbent politicians under his control. It was like undertaking business
mergers and acquisitions, which he is good at.
He also brought into the equation political marketing. Marketing is a
discipline that is a great invention of the Americans. But it is not limited to
advertising or commercial research. In the "Egg of Berlusconi", a book
written by Amedeo Nigara, "marketing means 'doing as you must in the
market'. Which is to say trying to understand the end user and his needs. And
create a product or a regulation that everyone can easily understand, without
impositions, but just as you do in a handshake.'' (See www.egg-of-berlusconi.com)
Through marketing techniques, Thaksin's political team worked with potential
voters at the grassroots, trying to understand the "end-users" or
their needs. Market surveys were conducted about the voters' needs based on
which the policies were drafted.
The strategists behind Thai Rak Thai's election victory were Pansak Winyaratn
and Dr Somkid Jatusripitak. While Pansak is a journalist, Somkid is an academic.
Along with his six staff, Pansak drew up a model for Thaksin and his Thai Rak
Thai to win the election. The model is similar to social marketing, which seeks
to address the needs of rural folk. If you want to take over the government, you
have to win the hearts and minds of rural voters first.
From the surveys, Thai Rak Thai was able to identify the policies that struck
a chord with the voters. Hence, the debt moratorium for farmers, the Bt1 million
working capital for each village, the Bt30 medical treatment and the People's
Bank. There was nothing totally new in these policies, except that they were
repackaged to boost "buyer" appeal.
At the same time, the Democrats were shooting themselves in the foot. People
were fed up with reform efforts and the slow pace of recovery. They wanted
change. History shows that reformist governments are unpopular. While the
Democrats stopped responding to the people's needs, Thai Rak Thai came up with
new promises and pledged to deliver them on a grand scale.
There was also a distinct political ideology underlying Thai Rak Thai's
policies. It was hardly apposite to the traditional economic growth model
pursued by Thai governments over the past several decades. Past policies
appeared to favour big corporations, big banks and foreign investors.
Thai Rak Thai would like to reverse this trend. At the centre of its policy
are rural enterprises, followed at an upper level by small-and medium-scale
enterprises (SMEs). These rural enterprises and SMEs have been left out in past
development, but they ideally would become a new taxable base for the country.
Thai Rak Thai would like to create a parallel financial system to support this
rural economy, hence the People's Bank and the SME Bank, which would provide
soft credit to help Thai entrepreneurs. The Bt1-million village fund is also
part of this networking to rebuild rural enterprises and create one product from
one tambon.
Pansak likes to compare Thailand with Italy. He says rural Thais are similar
to rural Italians. Yet the Italians enjoy a higher living standard. For example,
Italian farmers ship 35 different kinds of spaghetti to the cities.
"Nothing special about that, it is just spaghetti,'' Pansak snapped.
In a way, Thai Rak Thai's policy sounds like "contractual socialism'',
under which the government is obligated to look after the welfare of the
majority of the people.
But you may be curious about Thaksin, who represents the modern sector. How
come he is so interested in the plight of the poor? Will he try to please the
financial markets too? Certainly he needs the support of the financial markets,
but it is not yet clear how can he satisfy the rural sector and at the same time
cope with the discipline of the financial markets.
It might be suggested that the core policies of Thai Rak Thai are inward
looking, from attempts to water down the bankruptcy laws, easing bank
regulations to protecting the Thai interests in some businesses. But don't rush
to judgement. Let us wait and see how Thaksin is going to finance his populist
programmes. The devil is not only in the details, but also in the
implementation.
BY THANONG KHANTHONG
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