Throwing light on Supachai's memo
MARCH 23, 1999 -- Thanong Khanthong
and Vatchara Charoonsantikul examine specific recommendations in a memo
from Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi, the deputy prime minister and commerce minister.
Budget disbursement
ALARMED by the sluggish process of fiscal spending, Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi, the
deputy prime minister and commerce minister, has attempted to stimulate the bureaucracy.
The current fiscal year is due to end on Sept 30, 1999, and the government agencies will
only be able to disburse less than one-third of the Bt825 billion budget. Supachai would
like the target for fiscal disbursement to be set at 60 per cent now rather than 30 per
cent. Only civil servants' salaries are likely to be received on time, while all other
projects are lagging behind schedule. The delay in disbursement is doing harm to the
economy at a time when it needs fresh funds to help jump-start domestic demand.
By law, the Budget Bureau is responsible for budget disbursement. Since it is an agency
attached to the Office of the Prime Minister, there have not been definite agreements on
who should actually be responsible for overseeing an effective disbursement process.
On foreign exchange rate policy.
Supachai would not spell out clearly how he would like the baht's exchange rate to go,
but he believes that a weaker baht would not only boost exports but would also bolster the
service account. At present, Thailand is earning Bt240 billion in net foreign exchange a
year from tourism. A weaker baht would subsequently make Thailand even more attractive as
a preferred tourist destination in the region. It has been found that every 0.46 per cent
jump in exports in baht terms will result in an increase in the country's output by 1 per
cent.
However, Finance Minister Tarrin Nimmanahaeminda shares the International Monetary
Fund's view that the baht's present level is a result of macroeconomic adjustments,
particularly the reversal of the Thai current account into a surplus. Moreover, in the
management of the foreign exchange, the government cannot look at the export side alone,
but will have to take into account a balance in macroeconomic conditions, from inflation,
balance of payments, import capability, to foreign debt service capability.
On the Aug 14 Banking Restructuring Programme
Supachai would like the banking reform package to become mandatory rather than
voluntary so that all the banks would be forced to seek tier-1 capital support from the
government. His strategy is to tackle the ailing banking system on both the equity and
asset side. On the asset side, he would like the government to carve out 10 per cent of
the non-performing loans of the banks. This would relieve the banks' NPL burdens, so that
their balance sheets can be quickly improved.
Then the authorities must proceed by forcing the banks to take a bite of the tier-1
capital support from the banking reform package. If the programme is not mandatory, the
banks will continue to buy time, while downsizing their operations and loan books. The Aug
14th Banking Restructuring Programme is currently voluntary so that banks have to decide
whether or not to make use of government funds. Several critics share Supachai's view that
the government is not being decisive enough in dealing with the banks. Tarrin's
sympathisers said that given that the banks are politcally well-connected, it would not be
easy for the government to force this policy upon the big banks.
Secondly, the NPLs might need to be redefined. Supachai views that since creditor banks
and debtors have inked settlements, the banks must be allowed to remove those NPLs from
their books immediately, instead of having to wait for three months to do so. The
authorities would now like companies achieving debt restructuring to start making
repayments to the banks for three months so that the loans are considered good again.
Thirdly, Supachai views that the banking authorities' definition of NPLs should be
redefined when it comes to a group of companies. At present, the authorities prefer
aggressive banking prudence by requiring banks to book NPLs for an entire group of
companies if one of the subsidiaries defaults on its debts. Supachai thinks that with the
strategic NPLs -- those who have money but choose not to pay back the debts -- this
prudence is not realistic. Banks should only book NPLs from companies which default on
their repayments, and companies which are still servicing their debts but belong to the
same group should not incur NPLs for belonging to the same group.
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