UNLIKE the rescue of Siam Commercial Bank, regulators are faced with a more daunting
task in putting together a package to bail out Nakornthon Bank.
Aside from size, there is a big difference between the two banks that are seeking
public funds to help them recapitalise. While Siam Commercial Bank (1998 assets Bt716
billion) is still carrying a positive book value, Nakornthon Bank is suffering from a
negative book value.
With a positive book value of about Bt36.25 a share as of 1998, Siam Commercial Bank
has not been facing too many sleepless nights in trying to win the heart of the banking
regulators over its Bt60 billion recapitalisation plan.
From the regulators' view, injecting public money into both Siam Commercial Bank and
Nakornthon Bank during this time of banking distress carries enormous downside risks. To
play it safe, the Aug 14 Banking Restructuring Programme stipulates that regulators will
only bail out an ailing bank at a price below the book value. At least, if things take a
turn for the worst for the bank the government will limit its losses.
In the case of Siam Commercial Bank, the regulators at the Financial Restructuring
Advisory Committee, which supervises the Bt300-billion banking reform package, have given
the go-ahead for Siam Commercial Bank to raise Bt30 billion in a global offering, which if
successful will be equally matched by its contribution of Bt30 billion.
Initial response from Siam Commercial Bank's international roadshow in Asia, Europe and
the United States has been very positive with expectations that it will be able to muster
at least Bt20 a share for the global offering.
International institutional investors have reacted positively with Siam Commercial
Bank's global offering because of the government's commitment to stand side by side with
them.
With the government's injection of one unit (Bt30 billion) and investors' contribution
of an equal unit (Bt30 billion), the name of the game is that the investors will stand to
gain from both units after the bank has been turned around. For the government has agreed
to a buy-back agreement under which it will unload its stocks on investors at its original
cost plus some interest.
But in the case of Nakornthon Bank, regulators are facing a critical dilemma of either
closing it down permanently or rescuing it so that it can continue to operate as an
ongoing concern. Still, the task is made much more complicated by the fact that Nakornthon
Bank is operating with a negative net-worth. With a negative net-worth it means that even
after the bank sells off all of its assets it still cannot repay all of its liabilities.
The regulators have decided to bail out the bank and sell it off to a foreign partner
rather than shutting it down altogether, which could create more problems later. Besides,
the intervention in the likes of Bangkok Metropolitan Bank or Siam City Bank has taught a
costly lesson that without a new partner to help turn them around, these
government-controlled banks will continue to be sitting ducks, with endless costs to be
born by public money down the road.
Let's assume that Nakornthon Bank's book value is minus Bt5 a share. At what price
should the regulators or Standard Chartered Bank, which is the potential suitor, intervene
in the bank? Even if they inject money into the bank at one satang a share, it is still
too expensive, given the minus Bt5 a share in book value.
Regulations, as discussed above, do not permit the regulators to buy into an ailing
bank at a price more than the book value. It is both a technical and practical problem.
Enter the Financial Institution Development Fund (FIDF), the Santa Claus of the Thai
financial system. The regulators will try to circumvent this loophole of helping out a
bank with a negative net-worth by using the money from the FIDF to fill up the black hole
of about Bt10 billion first.
Nakornthon Bank is believed to carry problem loans of about Bt15 billion and only Bt5
billion has been set aside for provisions.
Certainly, there will be a big write-down of the bank's share capital to clean up the
problem loans.
The bank's board of directors will meet next week to determine this sensitive issue of
the size of the write-down. The matter will then be taken up at the shareholders meeting
scheduled for early next month.
The regulators have not given specific write-down instructions to the Wanglee family,
which has controlled the bank for the past 66 years, but will allow them to work it out at
the shareholders meeting.
''It will be a give-and-take kind of arrangement by which the bank will have to try to
win support from the shareholders,'' says a working official.
Overall, some Bt20 billion will be needed to put Nakornthon Bank back on its feet. Of
this amount, Bt13 billion will come from both the FIDF and from the banking restructuring
package.
At least Bt10 billion will be needed to put Nakornthon Bank back at zero per cent
tier-1 capital, which, however, must be maintained at 4.25 per cent of the total risk
assets to satisfy banking regulations.
Standard Chartered Bank will step in by injecting a fresh Bt7 billion into the bank to
turn it into a 69 per cent majority shareholder, who will have decisive management
control.
By doing so, the government will be carving out the bad debts for Standard Chartered
Bank, which will be limited in its investment or potential loss in Nakornthon Bank at Bt7
billion and enjoy a full presence and nationwide network of 69 branches.
Since most of the government money will be used to write off the bad debts, it will
emerge as only a 20 per cent shareholder. The Wanglee family and other minority
shareholders will keep about 11 per cent because they will be participating in a doubling
of the share capital of about Bt2 billion.
The windfall benefit will fall on Standard Chartered Bank, which -- unlike the
Radanasin Bank which has absorbed the Laem Thong Bank and immediately become a bad bank --
will have a clean bank to run on day one.
Since the government will be pitching in Bt13 billion into the bank, how can it make
sure it will get some of the money back?
There will be three ways that it might recover its money. First, the bank, under the
Standard Chartered Bank, will try to work out the bad debts and turn them into good debts,
a process that will take at least five years. This prospect depends on a turnaround of the
Thai economy.
Second, Nakornthon Bank will allocate a certain amount of its stocks to the government,
so that it will benefit from the upside gains when the bank recovers. The bank is
projected to continue to post losses this year and next and not until the year 2001 will
it start to make profits of about Bt800 million.
Third, warrants -- or a right to buy the bank's stock at a certain price and certain
time in the future -- will also be offered to the government, reportedly to the tune of
Bt800 million.
With this formula being worked out, Thai Military Bank, which is testing the waters
with the government's tier-1 capital support, might be tempted to copy this.
After all, it is just public money.
BY THANONG KHANTHONG