Threat of asset deflation looms
The IMF can only guarantee sovereign risk but it does not have experience handling
corporate risk, Vatchara Charoonsantikul and Thanong Khanthong
write.
The IMF badge now elegantly worn on Thailand's shoulder does not automatically
guarantee that the country will escape from an impending asset collapse as a result of
corporate risk. For Thailand, the IMF stands strictly for It's My Fault.
The IMF-sponsored financial and economic reform for Thailand, through a combined US$20
billion in stand-by credit and bridge loan arrangements, is only aimed at addressing the
sovereign risk. The stand-by credit will be largely placed at the doors of the Bank of
Thailand, which will use it as foreign exchange reserves to prop up the baht and cushion
international trade transactions. The credit will have nothing to do with corporate risk.
The debt structure of Thailand, unlike that of most other troubled countries seeking the
IMF cure, is 80 per cent private and 20 per cent public. Hence, resolving the sovereign
risk does not necessarily alleviate the corporate risk. The IMF does not have experience
in dealing with a country with a corporate risk like the one Thailand now has.
Thailand's external corporate debts amount to about US$70 billion, $42 billion of which
is loans provided by Japanese banks. Dr Virabongsa Ramangkura, the deputy prime minister,
has expressed deep gratitude to the Japanese banks for rolling over about 80 per cent of
their loans.
The remaining US$28 billion are loans extended to Thai companies by American and
European banks, which are still highly suspicious of the deteriorating asset quality of
their clients.
Looking ahead, it will be tough to win back confidence. The IMF's austere programme
clearly spells out the need to change the reckless behaviour of so many people living
beyond their means.
This year the current account deficit, the gap between domestic savings and investment
demand, will fall to 5 per cent, about $10 billion, of the gross domestic product (GDP),
compared to last year's 8 per cent.
The IMF would like Thailand to further reduce the current account deficit to 3 per cent
next year, amounting to a harsh attempt to contract the economy. Corporate bankruptcies
and unemployment pressure will be widespread as a result of this shock therapy. How can
fresh loans continue to flow in, given this severe environment?
The risk ahead lies in the impending collapse of assets. The banking and finance
authorities are scrambling to tackle the 58 ailing finance companies and the remaining 33
finance companies and 15 commercial banks.
Some of the 58 ailing finance firms may be put on a fast-track package under which they
will be allowed to re-open their doors for business, seek new partners, and have their due
diligence conducted later. However their net worth should be at least 30 per cent between
assets and liabilities to qualify for the fast track.
Those who fail to qualify for the fast track will be subject to purchase and
assumption. The government will only take responsibility for the gap between bad assets
and good assets. For this purchase, it will be setting aside Bt50 billion for the purpose
of subsidies.
The government will also help the 42 finance companies shut down in the second round by
negotiating with the foreign creditors to roll over the debts and reduce the interest
burden to 2 per cent. Most of these cash-strapped 42 companies are fundamentally sound.
A loan syndication for the good clients of these ailing finance companies will be
provided. The medium-scale companies, which are fundamentally sound, are suffering from a
liquidity dry-up because their deposits and loans are getting stuck in the beleaguered
finance companies.
The remaining ''healthy" 33 finance companies and 15 banks will be required to
strengthen their balance sheets by recapitalisation or by forming new partnerships. They
will also need to undergo a management restructuring. Foreign ownership in Thai banks and
finance companies will be raised to 49 per cent.
If necessary, the healthy finance companies or banks may be required to reduce their
capital first before undergoing a capital increase to accommodate the new partners.
Now the Thai economy is facing asset price deflation from the bursting of the bubble
economy. The asset collapse will take place after the finance companies or banks are
willing to let go of properties held as collateral to settle the debts.
For instance, if a finance company is to offer its stocks to a foreign investor at Bt12
a share, the foreign investor might bargain down to Bt7 a share. The purchase and
assumption process, in which good and bad assets will be separated through outright
buy-outs or mergers and acquisitions, will also accelerate asset deflation. If that is to
happen, it will trigger widespread asset collapse.
The storm has not yet abated.
|